The Stability of Exchange Networks by Gönül Dogan et al.
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 




The Stability of  
Exchange Networks  
Gönül Doğan, M.A.L.M. van Assen,  
Arnout van de Rijt and Vincent Buskens 
 











CTN – Coalition Theory Network 
 
 
Gönül Doğan and M.A.L.M. van Assen, Department of Methodology and Statistics,  
Tilburg University 
Arnout van de Rijt, Department of Sociology, Cornell University 





The Stability of Exchange Networks  
Summary 
This paper develops a formal model of exchange network stability that combines 
expected value theory (Friedkin 1995) with the economic literature on network 
dynamics. We identify stable networks up to size 8 for varying costs and investigate 
whether they are Pareto efficient and egalitarian. Only a very small number of networks 
are stable. Odd cycles and networks consisting of dyads and at most one isolate are the 
only egalitarian, efficient, and stable networks for a large cost range. We show that 
some of these results are generalizable to networks of any size and are independent of 
using expected value theory. 
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An exchange situation can broadly be defined as a situation involving actors who have 
the opportunity to collaborate for the benefits of all actors involved. While exchange has been 
intensively studied in economics for more than a century (e.g., Coddington 1968; Edgeworth 
1881; Young 1975), exchange entered the fields of social psychology and sociology only in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Homans (1958: 606) introduced the idea that ‘social 
behavior in an exchange of goods, material goods but also non-material ones, such as the 
symbols of approval and prestige’. The conception of social behavior as exchange was also used 
by other prominent social scientists in the same time period, such as Thibaut and Kelley (1959) 
and Blau (1964). After these important works research on exchange as a model of any social 
behavior gained a prominent position in social psychology and sociology. 
Since Stolte and Emerson (1977) and Cook and Emerson’s (1978) seminal study, 
sociologists have focussed on the effect of social structures on outcomes of exchange. The basic 
idea of this research is that social behavior is shaped by the social relations in which it occurs, 
which are in return conditioned by the structures within which they are embedded (Willer 1999: 
xiii). Where social behavior is conceived of as exchange, the social relation is dubbed an 
‘exchange relation’ and the structure is denoted an ‘exchange network’. If two persons have an 
exchange relation, this means that both persons have the opportunity to exchange, but they need 
not to do so. If they do not have an exchange relation, they have no opportunity to exchange. 
These opportunities and restrictions to exchange arise naturally in many real-life situations. Two 
of the most common causes for the absence of an exchange relation between two persons are 
natural barriers and non-matching preferences. Examples of barriers are not knowing each other, 
or not being able to contact or meet each other. And two persons also might not have an exchange relation because one of them has nothing to offer that is valuable enough to the other. 
An exchange network is a set of persons together with their exchange relations with persons in 
this set. Figure 1 depicts a simple example of an exchange network of four players, the Line4. In 
this network person A has a possibility to exchange with B, B additionally has a possibility to 
exchange with C, and C also with D.  
******* 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
******* 
In research on exchange networks in sociology two assumptions were commonly made, 
that we also make in the present study (see, e.g., Willer, 1999; special issue Social Networks 
June 1992; special issue Rationality and Society January 1997). First, an exchange relation is 
represented as an opportunity to split a common resource pool of size 24. Exchange occurs if two 
connected actors can agree on a division, if they do not agree they obtain no payoff. Second, 
players can only engage in one exchange, the so-called one-exchange rule. Applied to the Line4, 
the one-exchange rule implies, e.g., that B can exchange either with A or C, but not with both.  
In almost all theoretical and empirical studies on exchange in sociology the social 
structure was the independent variable, i.e., the effect of the network structure on outcomes of 
persons on different positions in the network was studied. The main result of this research on 
exchange networks is that the network structure has a huge impact on what actors earn in their 
exchange relations (e.g., Willer 1999; special issue Social Networks June 1992; special issue 
Rationality and Society January 1997). Since different positions in the network lead to vastly 
different payoffs, there is an enormous potential for actors to change the network. Important 
questions are therefore how these networks evolve in the first place, and which exchange networks are stable or resistant to change. That is, in our study the structure of the exchange 
network is the dependent variable: what does the structure look like if actors have the 
opportunity to change with whom they have an exchange relation? 
The question of how exchange networks evolve has received little attention in the 
literature (Kollock 1994). Only a handful of theoretical studies and, to our knowledge, not a 
single empirical study on the evolution of exchange networks has been carried out whereas there 
exist extensive experimental investigations of static exchange networks (Willer and Willer 
2000:252). In these experiments, networks were exogenously determined by the experimenters. 
Hence, by fixing the network, one of the most powerful tools to enhance outcomes of exchange 
is ignored: negotiating changes in the network itself (Leik 1992:309). Therefore, a desirable step 
in expanding the theory on network exchange is to formally incorporate an actor’s (person’s) 
potential to manipulate (i.e., to delete and add) his links (exchange relations), thereby enhancing 
his bargaining power in subsequent exchanges, thus indirectly increasing his expected payoff.  
In the present study we allow actors to manipulate their links in order to answer three 
research questions. The questions are: 
 (i)  Which exchange networks are stable? 
(ii)  Are stable exchange networks efficient? 
(iii)  Are stable exchange networks egalitarian and are egalitarian exchange networks stable? 
The notion of stability reflects that no actor in the network is willing to change his links; it can 
be considered as an equilibrium concept. We use Pareto efficiency as an efficiency measure: a 
network is considered Pareto efficient if there is no other network in which no actor earns less 
and some actors earn more. A welcome result would be that stable networks are also Pareto 
efficient. If no stable network is efficient at a given cost, it represents a social dilemma: the actors always end up in a social structure that is inferior to what they could have obtained in 
another structure, but none of the actors has an incentive to change one of his own links. Finally, 
egalitarian exchange networks are networks in which all actors earn exactly the same payoffs. A 
welcome result would be that stable networks are also egalitarian. If a stable network is not 
egalitarian, it represents an unfair situation because all actors in the exchange situation have 
identical properties. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Related research and the assumptions underlying 
our analysis are discussed in Section 2. We also motivate our selection of Friedkin’s (1992, 
1993, 1995) expected value theory (EVT) in order to answer research questions (i) to (iii). In 
Section 3, we introduce our model of network evolution, and our research questions are 
explicated. In Section 4, the results of our analyses are presented. The first part of Section 4 
contains the results on networks up to size 8 obtained with EVT. The second part contains the 
theorems for networks of any size and independent of the theory or payoff allocation function. 
We conclude with a discussion in Section 5. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The basic assumptions underlying our analysis are in line with those employed in the literature 
on exchange networks (e.g., Leik 1992; Markovksy et al. 1988, Willer and Willer 2000). It is 
assumed that the number of nodes in the network is constant and only directly linked nodes can 
engage in exchange. All resource flows are dyadic and the joint profit for any exchange is 
constant. All actors are involved in at most one exchange (the 1-exchange rule).  
  As a baseline to analyze the dynamics of exchange networks, we add the assumptions 
that actors have complete and accurate information about all network links and they maximize their own payoffs. We also assume that actors act as if they use the same theory to predict the 
consequences of adding and deleting links. The last assumption can also be phrased as: “Actors 
add and delete links and act upon it as if they were applying EVT of Friedkin (1995)”
1.  
Many theories of exchange networks have been developed and tested in the last three 
decades; power-dependence theory (e.g., Cook and Emerson, 1978; Cook and Yamagishi, 1992), 
exchange-resistance theory (e.g., Skvoretz and Willer, 1993), a graph analytic theory using the 
graph-theoretic power index (GPI) (e.g., Markovsky et al., 1988), core theory (e.g., Bienenstock 
and Bonacich, 1992), optimal seek theory (Willer and Simpson, 1999), identity theory (Burke, 
1997), Yamaguchi’s (1996; 2000) rational choice model, expected value theory (e.g., Friedkin, 
1992), and non-cooperative bargaining models (Berg and Panther, 1998; Braun and Gautschi, 
2006). Four theories have received much more attention in the literature than the other theories 
(Willer, 1999; special issue Social Networks June 1992; special issue Rationality and Society 
January 1997); core theory, power-dependence theory, expected value theory, and NET, which is 
the collection of exchange-resistance, GPI, and optimal seek theories.  
A requirement for our analysis is that the exact effect of adding and deleting links on 
actor payoffs is computable. Hence unique point predictions are required. Since core theory and 
power-dependence theory do not provide unique point predictions they are not suitable for our 
investigation. We did not select NET either; there are several different versions of the theory, 
and the most recent version of NET advocated by its developers is not computerized yet 
(Emanuelson 2005; Emanuelson & Willer 2006). Consequently we select the remaining theory: 
Friedkin’s (1992; 1993; 1995) expected value theory (EVT). Although uniqueness and existence 
                                                 
1 ‘As if’-assumptions are common in the social sciences; one famous example being the assumption in economics 
that actors behave as if they are rational maximizers (Friedman, 1953). for all networks is not proven, for every network up to 8 actors, the algorithm of EVT generates a 
point prediction. 
Expected Value Theory (EVT) 
Building upon the theory of social power proposed by French (1956), Friedkin (1986) first 
suggested the idea of using expected values to predict the outcomes in a power structure. 
Friedkin (1992; 1993) extended the idea of expected values to analyze outcomes in an exchange 
network. Friedkin’s model predicts the probability with which each maximal exchange pattern 
occurs, and the distribution of outcomes in each one of these patterns. A maximal exchange 
pattern is maximal in the sense that no further feasible transaction exists between the actors that 
haven’t exchanged yet. For example, the Line4 that has two maximal exchange patterns: {{A-B}, 
{C-D}}, and {{B-C}}. Using an iterative algorithm, each actor’s expected payoff is calculated as 
the expected value of his payoffs over all possible maximal exchange patterns.  
  As opposed to what the name suggests, EVT is not a theory based upon actors rationally 
maximizing their payoffs. The algorithm generating the predictions assumes that both actors’ 
claim of their share of the 24 points in their relation is increasing non-linearly in the probability 
that each of them is excluded in any exchange. Three rules determine the final allocation in the 
relation. Which rule is applied depends on the sum of both actors’ claims and their claims 
relative to half of the resource pool (12 points). An inconvenience of the EVT model is the 
analytical intractability of the algorithm because of the non-linear function and the three rules 
embedded in it. See Friedkin (1995) for details of the EVT model.  
Related Literature 
There exist two other approaches relevant to the study of the dynamics of exchange networks. 
Firstly, Bonacich (2001) simulates exchange network evolution and finds that in equilibrium payoff differentials are small. In Bonacich’s simulation, actors are myopic satisficers: They 
change the network if their earnings drop below a certain level. Our actors are myopic 
maximizers: they keep changing the network as long as marginal benefits outweigh marginal 
costs. Another difference is that instead of adding or deleting links, Bonacich’ actors move to 
another cell on a checkerboard, where they can exchange with actors in adjacent squares. 
Bonacich (2004) provides some intuitions for how this approach can be extended to more general 
structures. 
The second approach is a rapidly growing literature on network formation in economics 
(e.g., Dutta and Jackson 2003). Some networks considered in this literature are highly similar to 
exchange networks. Moreover, the concept of pairwise stability that we borrow from this 
literature derives from a model of network formation in which actors try to maximize their own 
payoff, and add and delete links one by one. In this work we use the stability concepts and the 
network formation model from economics. Thus, we explicitly bring research on network 
exchange in sociology and research on network formation in economics together. 
 
3. STABLE EXCHANGE NETWORKS: APPROACH AND HYPOTHESES 
A model of actor behavior is needed to study the stability of exchange networks. Our model 
assumes that for establishing a link between two actors mutual consent is required, while 
deletion of a link is unilateral. Since we also assume that both actors pay maintenance costs for a 
link between them, the assumption of mutual consent for link addition intuitively follows. 
The payoffs in each exchange relation in the network are predicted with EVT (Friedkin 
1995). For all exchange relations in each network we check if they are candidates for deletion by 
comparing the original EVT payoffs to the EVT payoffs after deleting the link. Similarly, for all pairs of actors without a direct link we check if the absent links are candidates for addition. Note 
that if two actors are both indifferent with respect to the absence or presence of a link, that link 
will neither be added to the network that does not contain that link nor be deleted from the 
network containing it. Hence, ‘not adding’ and ‘deleting’ are not the same.  
Friedkin’s EVT is a system of many assumptions and equations that makes a formal 
analysis very difficult. Nonetheless we could prove some general stability results that concern 
networks of any size, which either depend partially or do not depend on the assumptions of the 
EVT. However, we could not prove general results on the density of stable networks and the 
possible (non)existence of stable strong power networks. In order to get more insight into the 
properties of stable networks we choose to analyze a large subset of all possible exchange 
networks: all 13,597 exchange networks of size 2 to 8 are investigated. Of these networks 12,112 
are connected
2 and 1,485 are unconnected
3 (see sequence A001349 of Sloane’s Online 
Encyclopaedia of Integer Numbers). In Section 4 we will first present the results of the analysis 
of networks size 2 to 8 obtained with EVT, and second we will prove our general results for any 
size, all but one of which are independent of the payoff allocation function. 
Pairwise stability 
Stable networks are defined as exchange networks that are pairwise stable (PS). An exchange 
network is PS if (i) adding a currently absent link is costly to at least one of the two actors or 
leaves both actors equally well off, (ii) removing a present link does not benefit either of the two 
actors it currently connects. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced the pairwise stability 
concept, and in his survey on network formation Jackson (2003) argues that it might be 
                                                 
2 A network is connected if a path exists from each node to every other node. 
3 We need to consider unconnected networks as well, because through link deletion networks can become 
unconnected. In later sections it will be demonstrated that many stable and efficient networks are unconnected. considered as a necessary condition for network stability. It is the weakest notion of stability, 
allowing for link formation while providing narrow predictions about the set of stable networks.  
As an example of how to utilize the notion of pairwise stability, consider an 8-actor 
network where actor H is connected to actors A,B,C but not to other actors, denoted by the 
‘adjacency row’ 1110000. Then, with regard to actor H, PS holds if no single change from 1 to 0 
(the deletion of one link) increases H’s expected payoff, and if no single change from 0 to 1 (the 
addition of one link) increases the expected payoff of H while not decreasing the expected payoff 
of the other actor. Hence, only N-1=7 changes of the network are considered for that actor. A 
network is PS if this condition holds for each actor in the network. 
  The pairwise stability concept perfectly fits our model of actor behavior; link deletion is 
unilateral and for establishing a link mutual consent is required. In addition, pairwise stability is 
the prominent stability concept employed in the game- theoretic literature on network formation 
(for an overview, see Dutta and Jackson 2003). 
We analyze the stability of exchange networks as a function of link costs. In our analysis 
it is assumed that an equal cost is incurred for both actors involved in the link. Additionally, it is 
assumed that the cost of a link is independent of the number of links an actor has. Finally, the 
cost to establish a link is equal to the cost of maintaining a link. In our analyses the cost of a link 
varies from 0 to 12, where each actor involved in the corresponding link pays this cost. Note that 
link costs larger than 12 need not be considered. Since an exchange relation can only generate 24 
points, there always exists an actor in the relation who wants to delete the link for costs higher 
than 12; only networks without links are then PS. 
Concerning the stability of networks, we conjecture but cannot prove that with EVT 
payoffs all complete networks are PS when links are costless, and that there does not exist a PS network in which one actor earns a very high profit and other actors earn almost nothing (a so-
called ‘strong power’ network). Moreover, we expect that the average degree of PS networks 
decreases in costs. 
Refinements of pairwise stability 
In our analysis we use two stability concepts that are refinements of pairwise stability: pairwise 
Nash and unilateral stability. Pairwise Nash is a refinement of pairwise stability, and unilateral 
stability is a refinement of pairwise Nash. 
A network is strongly pairwise stable (Gilles and Sarangi 2004:13) or pairwise Nash (PN) 
(Calvó-Armengol & İlkılıç 2004:7) if (i) adding a presently absent link is costly to at least one of 
the two actors or leaves both actors equally well off; and (ii) removing a subset of an actor’s 
present links does not benefit this actor. Note that (i) of PN is identical to condition (i) of 
pairwise stability. The difference between PS and PN is that PN allows for simultaneous 
deletions in (ii). Continuing our other example, consider again the 8-actor network with H’s 
adjacency row equal to 1110000. PN holds for H if each change of one 0 to 1 does not increase 
the payoff of H and the other actor is not worse off, and each change of a subset of 1s to 0s does 
not increase H’s payoff. Hence, in total 4+2
3–1 = 11 changes are considered for that actor. A 
network is PN if this condition holds for each actor in the network.  
  An undesirable feature of PN is that it is asymmetric: it is concerned with the effect of the 
deletion of one or more links and of the addition of a single link. It also does not allow for 
simultaneous addition and deletion of links so that a network in which actors can only make 
themselves better off by replacing one relation by another relation is still considered stable. In 
unilateral stability (US), a refinement of PN, this asymmetry is resolved. A network is US if no 
actor can profitably reconfigure his links without objection by his new contacts. In our example, US holds for H if no adjacency row other than 1110000 simultaneously (i) increases H’s payoff, 
and (ii) makes no actor connected to H in the new adjacency row, but not in the old one, worse 
off. Only the actors newly connected to H in the new configuration or adjacency row have to 
agree, because only for creating new links mutual consent is required. Note that H considers all 
possible 2
N−1−1 = 127 reconfigurations of his links. A network is US if this condition holds for 
each actor in the network.  
Egalitarian networks 
Networks are defined as egalitarian if all actors in the network obtain the same payoff, after 
subtracting the costs for links actors have. Some examples of egalitarian networks are complete 
networks, cycles, and even sized networks consisting of only dyads. We will emphasize these 
networks in our results. We will categorize PS networks that are egalitarian and that are not. 
It can be shown that EVT predicts equal outcomes for vertex transitive graphs for any 
cost level. A vertex transitive graph is a graph where all actor positions are equal (see Weisstein 
for a formal definition). There are 37 vertex transitive graphs from size 2 to 8. There are 7 other 
networks that are egalitarian only at cost 0 which are combinations of disconnected vertex 
transitive graphs of size 6 and 8. These are not included in our calculations. 
Efficiency 
With the introduction of link costs inefficient PS networks might arise. Efficiency here is defined 
as Pareto efficiency; there exists no other network in which no actor earns less and at least one 
actor earns more. To determine if a network is Pareto efficient, the actor payoffs for all exchange 
networks of the same size are ordered in a vector from large to small. A network is then Pareto 
efficient if no other network’s payoff vector is strictly larger than that of the network under 
consideration. We will categorize both efficient PS and inefficient PS networks. We will investigate if there are cost levels for which no PS network of a given size is Pareto-efficient. If 
such cost levels exist, we say that there is a tension between efficiency and stability and say that 
a social dilemma exists. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Results for networks of sizes 2 through 8  
The results for networks of sizes 2 through 8 include the analysis of PS networks, the analysis of 
PN and US networks, and the efficiency and equality of stable networks, respectively. All results 
are aggregated over size, but not over cost levels since cost is an important explanatory variable 
while size is not. Nonetheless, if different trends are observed for different network sizes then 
they are reported. Finally, in the appendix, we include the number of PS, PN, and US networks 
of each size at any cost level and whether they are egalitarian or efficient.  
4.1.1 Pairwise Stable networks 
To see which networks are PS with changing costs, we checked whether each network is PS and 
if PS then in which cost interval. Across cost intervals 0 to 12, in total, 180 different PS 
exchange networks exist, which is only 1.32 % of all 13,597 exchange networks up to size 8. The 
percentage of PS networks decreases with size as can be seen from the table in the appendix. At 
size 2, both the empty network and the dyad (100%) are PS whereas at size 8 only 0.8 % of 
networks are PS. Hence pairwise stability is a rare attribute of exchange networks of small size. 
We exclude from the analysis 9 networks consisting of dyads and at least two isolates that are 
only PS at cost 12.  
When there are no costs of adding, maintaining and deleting a link there are 10 PS 
networks. As expected, all 7 complete networks are PS. For the networks of size 5 and 7 also networks consisting of two unconnected complete networks are PS. With 5 actors, a dyad and a 
triangle that are not connected is PS. Likewise, when there are 7 actors, the combination of the 
complete 3 and 4, and complete 2 and 5-actor networks are PS. These unconnected networks are 
PS because no one wishes to delete any link, and if the two parts in the network are connected, 
the payoff decreases for the actor in the larger sub-network that connects to the smaller sub-
network. As an example consider the disconnected dyad and triangle (3-cycle). The actors cannot 
gain from deleting any existing link. As for adding a link, the expected payoff of the actor in the 
triangle connected to the dyad becomes 7.46, while before the addition it was 8 points. 
With the introduction of costs, we see clear patterns of change in the set of stable 
networks. Starting at zero cost and gradually increasing cost, complete networks destabilize
4, PS 
networks become less dense and only unconnected dyads and at most one isolate (in case of 
networks of odd size) are stable when cost is in (6.551,12). We call the unconnected dyads and at 
most one isolate (in case of networks of odd size) M(inimal) networks. In Theorem 1 below, we 
show that given EVT payoffs an M-network of any size is US (and therefore also PN and PS) for 
any cost c in (3.48,12). We also show in Theorem 2 that M networks are the only PN and US 
networks for cost c in (6,12)
5 independent of the payoff allocation function.  
    ******* 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
******* 
The gradual change in the number of stable networks across size as a function of cost 
level is shown in Figure 2. The x axis denotes the cost level; the y axis denotes the number of PS networks. Since at certain cost levels some PS networks cease to be PS and some networks enter 
as PS, the number of PS networks changes with increasing costs. The number of stable networks 
gradually increases up to cost 0.42, and fluctuates thereafter. The maximum number of 46 PS 
networks is obtained at cost 1.22. The minimum number of 7 PS networks is obtained at cost 
6.55 and stays there until cost 12. A similar trend is observed in networks of each size separately 
from 4 to 8. 
******* 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
******* 
The effect of cost on density is apparent from Figure 3. As expected, the average density 
of stable networks decreases with cost, although not monotonically. As an example consider the 
PS networks of size 4. For costs in the interval [0, 4.026] the complete network is PS. The Box 
(4-cycle), is PS for costs in [2.811, 5.138]. Two dyads are PS when cost is in [3.482, 12]. A 
triangle and an isolate is stable for costs in (4.114, 6.551). At cost 12 or higher, only the empty or 
null network is PS. Note that the often investigated Line4 network is never stable. Hence our 
analysis suggests that in real-life exchange settings, the Line4 network will not occur often. The 
networks of size 5 to 8 have a similar trend. 
We also investigated the cost ranges for which networks are PS. A cost range is defined 
as the width of the interval a network is PS. For example, the cost range for which the triangle is 
stable is 6.551 since it is stable from cost level 0 to 6.551. When we look at the range of costs 
that networks are PS, we see that the median cost range is 0.250, and 62 PS networks are stable 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The only PS complete network at cost 12 is the dyad with 2 actors. Of all complete networks, the 7-person network 
destabilizes at cost 0.395, the 5-person at cost 0.839, 8-person at cost 1.325, the 6-person at cost 2.104, the 4-person for a cost range of 0.5 or more. There are only 24 networks which are PS in the cost range 
between 2.5 and 12. So, the majority of the PS networks are very sensitive to the cost level and 
destabilize even in small cost changes. Odd-sized cycles and networks consisting of dyads 
including the M networks have large stability ranges: between 4.973 and 12 with the median 
being 8.512. Thus, these networks are among the most stable networks. 
Finally, an important observation on the payoff allocation of PS networks can be made. 
They are rather egalitarian. First, no PS network is a so-called ‘strong power’ network; there is 
no network up to size 8 with at least one actor earning almost all points. Also, a majority of the 
PS networks yield payoffs which are less than or equal to 12 before subtracting the cost of links. 
Out of 180 PS networks, 32 of them are weak power, that is, contain payoffs higher than 12 for 
some players, before subtracting costs. Among these 32 networks, 9 networks include players 
with payoffs between 13 and 14 and 1 network where one player earns 14.69. After subtracting 
the costs of links, all payoffs fall below 12-c, the payoff of actors in even M networks. No weak 
power network is PS for costs larger than 2.723, and none is PS for a cost range larger than 
0.428. The median cost range of weak power networks is 0.097, which is substantially smaller 
than that of PS networks (0.250). Thus, weak power networks destabilize quickly. Among the 
network sizes investigated, only equal power networks are PS for a large cost range. 
4.1.2. Refinements of Pairwise Stability  
Pairwise Nash networks 
There are 149 PN networks among the networks investigated. At cost 0, all 10 PS networks are 
also PN. For 103 of the 149 networks the cost interval for which it is PN is identical to that for 
which it is PS. For the other 46 networks the interval is smaller. The lower bound of the PS 
                                                                                                                                                             
at cost 4.026 and the triangle at cost 6.551. interval is the same as that of the PN interval because the lower bound concerns link addition. 
Hence differences in the intervals always are in the upper bound of the interval that concerns 
single link deletion (PS) versus multiple link deletion (PN). 
The majority of the PN networks, 97 out of 149, are PN within a cost range of 0.5 or 
smaller. Only 17 networks are PN over a cost range of 2.5 or more, including M networks (7) 
and odd cycles (3).
6 All M networks are PN in the same cost range as they are PS. However, the 
odd-sized cycles -3, 5 and 7- are PN in smaller cost ranges than in PS. This obviously emerges 
from the fact that PN networks allow for multiple deletions of links, hence no network where 
players earn negative payoffs in a cycle can be PN. For example, the triangle is PS but not PN in 
the interval (4, 6.551). 
The stricter stability notion of PN reduces both the proportion of stable weak power and 
the proportion of stable equal power networks. There are 26 PN networks with some players’ 
payoffs larger than 12, and 9 of these networks contain payoffs larger than 13.  
Unilateral Stable networks 
  There are 130 US networks among the networks investigated. At cost 0, only the 
complete networks of each size are US; the 3 unconnected networks that are PS and PN are not 
US. Unilateral stability cost intervals are smaller compared to PS in 48 of the US networks and 
are the same for the rest. The differences in the cost intervals between US and PS lie both on the 
upper bound and the lower bound.  
                                                                                                                                                             
5 We cannot prove a similar theorem for PS because of the complicated EVT payoff calculations. 
6 These are: M networks (7), odd cycles (3), 4 sized complete network, 3-cycle and dyad, 5-cycle and dyad, 5 sized 
complete network with a dyad, 3-cycle and 4 sized complete, octagon, and 2 disconnected 4 sized complete 
networks. The majority of the US networks, 89 out of 130, are US within a cost range of 0.5 or 
smaller. Only 15 networks are US over a cost range of 2.5 or more including M networks (7) and 
odd cycles (3)
7. All M networks are US in the same cost range as they are PS.  
As PN, US does not eliminate weak power networks; there are 21 US weak power 
networks, where 8 of them contain payoffs larger than 13.  
4.1.3. Stability and equality of exchange networks 
Of all 13,597 networks, 37 networks are egalitarian, which is only a very small 
percentage (0.003%). Out of 180 different PS networks 35 exchange networks have equal 
payoffs within the cost range they are stable, which amounts to 19.44% of all PS networks. 
Hence except 2 egalitarian networks of size 8, all egalitarian networks are also PS at some cost 
(94.59%). 
When we look at the cost range these networks are PS, we see that egalitarian networks 
tend to be PS over a larger range than non-egalitarian networks. 17 of the 35 egalitarian 
symmetric PS networks are stable in a cost range of 1 or more, and the median cost range is 
0.925. In contrast, 117 of 145 non-egalitarian PS networks are PS in a cost range less than 1. 
Hence both weak power and non-egalitarian networks are very sensitive to small changes in cost 
and tend to destabilize quicker than egalitarian networks.  
******* 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
   *******  
                                                 
7 The other networks are: 4 sized complete network, 3-cycle and dyad, 5-cycle and dyad, 5 sized complete network 
with a dyad, and octagon All egalitarian PS networks are also PN; hence there are 35 egalitarian PN networks. 
These egalitarian networks have the same properties as PS networks except 4 networks 
containing cycles where the PN ranges are substantially smaller than PS ranges. The cycles are 3, 
5 and 7 cycles and a 6-player network consisting of two disconnected triangles. There are 34 
egalitarian US networks. Almost all egalitarian networks have the same cost ranges as PN with 
the most notable exceptions of 3 odd-sized cycles. The only egalitarian network that is not US 
but PS is the 6-player network consisting of two disconnected triangles.  
4.1.4. Stability and Pareto efficiency of exchange networks 
Figure 4 summarizes results that concern the efficiency and equality of PS networks. Let 
a network be globally efficient if it is Pareto efficient in the cost interval in which it is PS, 
partially dominated if it is Pareto efficient in only a part of this interval, and completely 
dominated if it is never Pareto efficient within the interval. Then, of the 180 PS networks, 19 are 
globally Pareto efficient, 15 are partially dominated, and 146 are completely dominated in the 
cost interval within which they are PS. Of the 19 globally Pareto efficient networks, 7 networks 
are empty and 7 are M. The M networks are undominated for cost ranges of 8.518 to 12. The 
other 5 globally Pareto efficient networks are PS in a cost range of 0.383 or less. 
Out of the 15 partially dominated networks only 7 are undominated for a cost range from 
0.412 to 4.678. The least dominated PS networks are cycles, cycles combined with dyads, and a 
7-person network which is difficult to describe
8. The median stability range of these 7 networks 
is 5.826. So, in addition to the M networks the 3, 5 and 7 cycles, possibly in combination with 
dyads, are the most stable and efficient networks. Note also that the even M networks and odd 
                                                 
8 These are: the triangle, the triangle with one dyad, the pentagon, the triangle with two dyads, the pentagon with the 
dyad, and the heptagon. size cycles are egalitarian, which are in total 7 networks. The odd M networks and cycles in 
combination with one or more dyads are not egalitarian.
9 
If no stable network is efficient at a given cost level, we say a social dilemma exists: 
given any starting network, the actors never reach an efficient (stable) network . When we 
examine the undominated and partially dominated PS networks and their ranges of stability, we 
see that for size 4, 6 and 8 there exist social dilemmas. For size 4 there does not exist any 
undominated PS network between cost 0.004 and 3.4819; for size 6 there is no undominated PS 
network between cost 0.0021 and 3.4819, and for size 8 between cost 0.0013 and 3.4819. In 
these cost ranges all PS networks are dominated by an M network and the M networks are PS 
only after cost 3.4819. Although these results suggest that it holds for even networks of any size, 
we were not able to prove it. 
The inefficiency of PS networks can be due to our limiting of the actors’ action space. 
Pairwise stability considers only single link changes, while pairwise Nash allows for 
simultaneous deletions and unilateral stability allows for any reconfiguration of links. Thus PN 
and US networks might be more efficient than PS networks. As an example, the complete 3-actor 
network with link cost 5 is PS but not PN nor US. The expected payoff of each actor in the 
complete 3-actor network is 8 – 2×5 = −2, while in the empty 3-actor network, each actor earns 
0. If an actor deletes one of his links, his expected payoff decreases from –2 to 1.45–5 = –3.55. 
Only after deleting both his links does an actor’s payoff increase to 0. However we found that 
neither pairwise Nash nor unilateral stability eliminates inefficient stable networks.  
                                                 
9 We also checked Pareto efficiency within the set of 180 PS networks for each size. In the range that networks are 
PS, 38 networks are undominated, 54 networks are partially dominated, and 88 PS networks are totally dominated in 
this range by another network that is also PS in that range. This means that there might be a high probability that the 
outcomes of the end paths of the network evolution are inferior to that of other possible end paths, as well as to those 
in networks that are not an end path (in case of a social dilemma). Only 23 PN networks are globally efficient; the 7 M networks, 7 empty networks, 6 
cyclic networks which are 3, 5, and 7 cycles and dyads with these cycles, and 3 networks which 
are of size 7 and difficult to describe. Note that the cycles are not globally efficient in the range 
they are PS, but are globally efficient in the range they are PN. This is because the PS cycles are 
dominated by empty networks for larger costs, at which they are not PN. 117 of the 149 PN 
networks are totally dominated and a further 9 networks are partially dominated. However, 
among the partially dominated networks, with the exception of one network, the domination 
range covers almost all stability range. Hence, the PN concept seems to differentiate the Pareto 
efficient cycles and M networks more from the other stable networks than PS does.  
There are 23 globally efficient US networks. These networks are the same as the 
undominated PN networks. 101 of the 130 US networks are totally dominated, a further 5 
networks are partially dominated such that the undomination range is less than 0.004 and 1 
network with an undomination range of 0.382.  
4.2 General Results 
The analysis of networks up to size 8 demonstrated that M networks are important: they 
were efficient, stable for a large cost range, and egalitarian if the network size is even. Here we 
prove some general results on the stability (theorems 1 and 2) and efficiency (theorems 3 to 5) of 
M networks of any size. The results of theorems 2 to 5 are also independent of the selection of 
theory or payoff allocation function used.  
The analysis of networks up to size 8 demonstrated that M networks are US (and hence 
PN, and PS) for high costs. This result can be generalized to networks of any size with EVT 
payoffs, as theorem 1 shows. Theorem 1: Given EVT payoffs, an M network of any size is US (and therefore also PN and PS) 
for any cost c in (3.48,12). 
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider an odd sized M network of size 13 or larger. If the network is US, 
neither a reconfiguration of the ego network of the isolate nor of a member of a dyad is accepted. 
Let us first consider each possible reconfiguration of the ego-network of the isolate. The isolate 
has no links to delete and can maximally profitably add six links, because then c × 3.48 > 24. If 
the isolate wants to add links to both actors in one dyad, EVT reveals that these actors reject his 
proposal because their payoff is lowered independent of which other links are added. If links are 
added to one actor of different dyads, the isolate obtains a disadvantageous position resulting in a 
low expected payoff that does not exceed the link costs. Consequently, the isolate does not want 
to add links in odd-sized M networks.  
  Let us now consider reconfigurations of the ego-network of an actor in a dyad. This actor 
cannot improve his payoff by adding more than four links, since then he earns 24 – 5×3.48 or 
less, which is less than the 12 – 3.48 he earns in the M network. Three changes are possible; (i) If 
he proposes to connect to the isolate, the isolate always rejects the proposal. (ii) If he proposes to 
add links to actors of the same dyad, these actors reject the proposal. (iii) Finally, EVT reveals 
that if he connects to one or more actors of up to four different dyads, the other actors reject his 
proposal. Hence also in odd-sized M-networks actors in dyads do not want to change their ego-
network. End of proof for odd sized networks. Note that the combination of (ii) and (iii) 
complete the proof for even sized networks of any size. Q.E.D. 
Although the result of Theorem 1 is dependent on using EVT, one can construct 
alternatives of Theorem 1 using other theories of network exchange. In order to construct such an 
alternative one requires a theory of network exchange that predicts both probabilities of exchange patterns and outcomes of actors in each of these patterns. The two well-known theories 
of network exchange briefly discussed in the introduction, core theory and power-dependence 
theory, do not satisfy this criterion. The other and most employed theory of network exchange, 
NET, does. Three variants of NET, i.e., GPI-R, GPI-RD, GPI-l*2, allocate 13.5, 14.5, 14.6 points 
to the middle actors in the Line4, respectively, and 1 point to peripherals in the Line3 
(Emanuelson 2005: 160). An alternative of Theorem 1 can be constructed and proven for each 
variant of NET with cost c in (x-12,12), with x equal to the payoff of the middle actor predicted 
by that variant. 
  The absence of any other PS networks than M networks at costs larger than 6.551 
suggests that for any cost c in (6.55,12) the only PS networks of any size are M networks. 
Although we firmly believe this to be true, we were unable to prove it using Friedkin’s EVT. If 
the conjecture is false, then there exists at least one network in which each link has a marginal 
benefit to both actors in the link larger than 6.55. Nonetheless, we can prove that with cost c in 
(6,12), the only PN and US networks are M networks regardless of the theory used.. 
Theorem 2: Given any payoff allocation function and assuming that each actor in a dyad gets 
half of the total payoff, the only PN (and US) networks with c in (6,12) are M networks.  
Proof of Theorem 2: The networks with fewer links than M networks are not stable since link 
addition is profitable for two isolates. Hence it suffices to show that in any network with more 
links than an M network with c in (6,12) at least one actor wants to delete at least one of his 
links. Such a network has at least one component consisting of at least three actors. For the proof 
one only needs to consider such a component. 
Let us assume the component has k actors with p links in total. Consider first that k is 
odd. Then the net total payoff cannot exceed 24×(k-1)/2 – 2pc, which is less than 0 if c > 6(k-1)/p. Since the minimum value of p is k-1, the net payoff in the component is negative if c > 6. 
Then there exists at least one actor who obtains a negative payoff. This actor can improve her 
payoff and obtain 0 by deleting all of her links.
10 
Now, consider that k is even. The net payoff is less than 0 if c > 6k/p. Components with k 
or more links are not stable for c > 6 because then the net total payoff is negative and at least one 
of the actors will delete all his links. Consider the minimally connected component containing k-
1 links. In such a component there is an actor i with 1 link. Actor i will maintain his link iff i’s  
payoff excluding link cost is larger than c so that xi ≥ c. Actor i’s neighbor j has at least two links 
and should get at least 12 – c, or else he would delete all his links except with i. Assume j has 
two links, then xj – 2c ≥ 12 – c, which yields xj  ≥ 12 + c. However, if c > 6 then xi + xj > 12 + 2c 
> 24. Hence if 6 < c < 12 actor j will delete one of his links to end up in a dyad. If j has more 
than two links he will delete all links except to one of his neighbors who has only one link. 
Q.E.D. 
It can easily be shown that many Pareto efficient networks exist at cost 0. Consider all 
networks in which always a maximal number of exchanges is completed for that size, called F 
networks in Theorem 3. This maximum, denoted by FX, is equal to N/2 if the number of actors N 
is even and to N/2 – ½ if N is odd, where N is the size of the network. 
Theorem 3: Given any payoff distribution function, F networks are Pareto efficient at zero cost. 
Proof of Theorem 3: In F networks a maximum sum of payoffs equal to 24×FX is divided among 
the N actors. Since the sum of payoffs to be divided in all these networks is equal, one of the 
networks cannot Pareto-dominate the other. Q.E.D. 
                                                 
10 Since with pairwise stability one cannot delete more than one link, this proof cannot be generalized to PS 
networks. Note that there are PS networks in which all actors obtain negative payoffs, like the complete 3-actor 
network for cost (6, 6.551). There are many F networks. However, there are only very few PS networks at zero costs. 
Consequently, at zero costs there are many efficient networks that are not PS.  
  When costs are introduced Theorem 3 no longer applies. To derive statements concerning 
the Pareto efficiency of PS networks another theorem is required. 
Theorem 4: Given any payoff distribution function, an M network is Pareto efficient for any cost 
in the closed interval [0,12]. 
Proof Theorem 4: Exactly FX exchanges are carried out in the M network that consists of exactly 
FX links. Hence the total payoff to be divided in the M network is equal to FX(24 – 2c) ≥ 0 if c ≤ 
12. Adding a link decreases the payoff to be divided with 2c, deleting a link decreases the payoff 
to be divided with 24 – 2c ≥ 0 if c ≤ 12. Since there is no network with a larger payoff to be 
divided, the M network is Pareto efficient. Q.E.D. 
Note that M networks are the only efficient networks for costs in the interval (0,12) if 
efficiency of a network is defined as the maximum sum of actor payoffs across all networks of 
the same size. 
At cost 0 all PS networks are Pareto efficient. From cost 6 to 12 (excluding 12 itself) only 
the seven M networks, one for each size, are Pareto efficient. This result can be generalized to 
networks of any size and to almost all payoff distribution functions. 
Theorem 5: Given that the payoff distribution function never assigns 24 points to a player in an 
exchange, the only networks that are Pareto efficient at costs greater than or equal to 6 are M 
networks.  
Proof Theorem 5: Theorem 4 indicates that an M network is Pareto efficient. It remains to be 
shown that an M network is the only Pareto efficient network for c ≥ 6. If it can be shown that the theorem is true for c = 6, it is also true for all c > 6 because the actors’ degree and hence their 
costs are minimized in the M network. The theorem is false if either (i) there is a network in 
which all actors obtain a positive expected payoff if the number of actors is odd, or (ii) there is a 
network in which one actor obtains more than 12 – c points. Let us first show that (i) is false. 
First assume the network is odd and of size n + k, with n even and k odd. All n actors form 
dyads, and the k  actors form a connected network. k actors form a connected component, 
otherwise at least one of them does not obtain a positive payoff. The sum S of net actor payoffs 
in the connected k-actor component is at most S = (k-1)×12 – t×12, with t denoting the number of 
links. Note that t ≥ k – 1, otherwise k actors cannot be connected. If t > k – 1 then S < 0 and there 
is at least one actor obtaining a negative payoff. If t = k – 1 then S = 0 and either all actors earn 0 
net payoffs or some actors earn positive payoffs while at least 1 other actor earns negative. 
Hence (i) is false.  
  Consider part (ii). An actor can only earn more than 12 points if he has more than one 
link. If he has one link he obtains at most 12 – c when he is a member of a dyad. If he has three 
links or more his expected payoff is smaller than 12 – c because he can never gain 24 points 
excluding costs. Consider an actor having two links. The marginal value of the link for both of 
his partners must be at least 6. If one of his partners obtains at least 6, he can never get more than 
18 in his exchanges with his partners. Consequently, he obtains 18 – 2c < 12 – c. Q.E.D. 
. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Research on exchange in sociology has focused on the effect of the social structure on outcomes 
of exchange. In almost all of this research the exchange network was the independent variable. 
The main result of this research is that the network structure has a huge impact on what actors earn in their exchange relations. Because different positions in the network obtain different 
payoffs, the questions of how these networks evolve, and which networks are stable, arise. 
However, these questions have received little attention in the literature. In the current article the 
network structure is the dependent variable, i.e., we study what the network structure looks like 
if actors have the opportunity to change with whom they have an exchange relation. The 
questions investigated in the current article are: (i) which exchange networks are stable?, (ii) are 
stable exchange networks efficient?, (iii) are stable exchange networks egalitarian and are 
egalitarian exchange networks stable?  
  In answering these three research questions we employ the same assumptions mostly 
used in the sociological literature on exchange networks, including the 1-exchange rule and that 
the value of each exchange relation is the same. Additionally, we assume that actors can 
manipulate their links; for adding links mutual consent is needed, while link deletion is 
unilateral. Links are costly and the cost is the same for both actors in the link. To assess stability 
of an exchange network we employed three stability concepts from the economic literature on 
networks: pairwise stability, pairwise Nash, and unilateral stability. Networks were considered as 
efficient if they were Pareto efficient, while networks were considered egalitarian if all actors in 
the network earn the same payoff. To calculate the actors’ payoff we used Friedkin’s Expected 
Value Theory. First, we investigated all networks up to size 8, then we proved five general 
results. One result uses EVT but generalize to networks of any size, the other results not only 
generalize to networks of any size but are also independent of the payoff allocation function. 
  Focusing first on the results on small size networks, the percentage of PS networks is 
very small and decreases in network size. The density of the PS networks decreases in cost. 
While no strong power network is pairwise stable, some weak power networks are. Two types of networks are observed to have a large cost range in which they are stable: M networks which 
consist of only dyads and at most one isolate, and odd cycles. Only very few networks are 
egalitarian, but almost all of them are stable at a certain cost. Moreover, egalitarian networks are 
stable in a larger cost range than other stable networks. Even size M networks and odd cycles are 
egalitarian, and these networks are also efficient for a larger cost range than other networks. 
Finally, we observe social dilemmas in even size networks for low cost; that is, for low costs 
none of the stable networks is efficient. Using pairwise or unilateral stability does not change any 
of these results.  
  Despite the fact that we could not prove results on the relation between cost and density, 
the absence of strong power networks, the presence of social dilemmas for even size networks 
using EVT, we were able to derive some general results. We showed that, given EVT payoffs, an 
M network of any size is stable for cost in (3.48, 12). We also showed that this result can be 
generalized using the payoff allocation function of Network Exchange Theory, but the cost 
interval changes to (2.78, 12). We also found that, independent of the payoff allocation function, 
M networks are the only stable (PN and US) networks for cost (6, 12), they are efficient for any 
cost, and are the only efficient networks for cost (6, 12). 
  A welcome result was that almost all egalitarian networks up to size 8 are stable at a 
certain cost. Although actors are payoff maximizers and do not care for equity, they are 
“satisfied” in egalitarian networks. However, many unfair networks are stable as well. An 
extreme example would be the odd size M network where one actor is excluded, which is 
efficient, stable, and very unfair. An interesting empirical question is to what extent exchange 
networks would evolve into (un)fair exchange networks. Additionally, to what extent actors’ 
preferences for equity do affect stability of networks, and whether these preferences are observed in the evolution of exchange networks remain to be examined. Preferences for equity can be 
incorporated in the payoff function as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
  As for the efficiency of stable networks, the results were not as one might hope. Although 
some stable networks at a certain cost were also efficient, many stable networks were not. Hence 
coordination problems exist at many cost levels; some stable networks are efficient, but other 
stable networks are dominated at the same cost. Social dilemmas, which are coordination 
problems where none of the stable networks at a certain cost is efficient, were also found for 
even size and low cost. At cost levels with social dilemmas, the M network is efficient but not 
stable because each actor would like to form a link with one actor of another dyad. It is an 
interesting empirical question whether actors are able to resist this temptation and end up in the 
efficient but not stable M network. Similar to equality, the effect of actors’ preferences for 
efficiency on the stability of networks, and whether these preferences are observed when 
studying the evolution of exchange networks in the lab remain to be examined. Efficiency, like 
equity, can also be incorporated in the payoff function as in Charness and Rabin (2002). 
  The focus of the present article was on the possible end paths of the evolution of exchange 
networks, that is, the stable networks. Investigating how to get to these possible endpoints, i.e., 
the evolution of the network, would be a natural extension. The probability that each stable 
network is reached would also be investigated. Factors that will determine these probabilities are 
the initial network configuration (e.g., empty [nobody knows each other], complete [everybody 
has access to and can exchange with each other], or random), costs, and preferences for equity 
and efficiency. It might also be that stable networks differ to the extent that they are sensitive to 
possible errors of actors. In one stable network one error might be enough to move to another stable network, while another stable network might still be stable even after one or more 
accidental errors. These issues remain to be investigated both in the lab and by simulation. 
  In our analysis we assumed that actors were myopic; they only took their immediate payoff 
into account, and not the consequences of their behavior on future payoffs. The justification of 
this assumption is not only that it makes the analysis much more tractable, but also that actor 
behavior in the lab is myopic as well. Most actors are found to think two or at most three steps 
ahead in many different experimental games (Camerer 2003, Ch 5). Allowing for farsighted 
actors in models of network evolution is nevertheless identified by Dutta and Jackson (2003:13) 
in their book on network formation “as perhaps the most important (and possibly the hardest) 
issue regarding modeling the formation of networks”. Actors taking the future into account are 
likely to affect the evolution and stability of exchange networks. To mention two examples, 
taking the future into account gives opportunities to solve a social dilemma and the problem of 
inefficiency of stable networks as described above. The even M network which is efficient but 
not stable at low costs can be sustained as an equilibrium if the actors are rational and the 
‘network evolution game’ is indefinitely repeated. The odd M network is efficient but neither 
stable at low cost nor egalitarian. Again, if the shadow of the future is sufficiently long the actors 
might coordinate on alternating who is excluded in the M network such that both efficiency and 
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Table 1: Number of PS, PN, and US networks for costs 0 to 12. Number of stable networks do 
not include networks that are stable at only cost 12, and the parentheses indicate the percentage 
of networks that are stable. Number of egalitarian networks do not include networks that are 
egalitarian at cost 0 or at cost 12. The number of Pareto efficient networks include both partially 
dominated and undominated networks; the parentheses indicate the number of networks that are 
undominated in a range of 0.1 or more.  
               A      B      C      D        
 
Figure 1: The Line4 exchange network. 




























Figure 2: Number of PS networks in total from size 2 to 8 as a function of cost. The points refer 
to the cost levels where there is a new PS network emerging or a PS network dropping from the 
list or both.   
 






























Figure 3: Average density of PS networks from size 2 to 8 as a function of cost. Density is 
defined as the proportion of links in the network to the number of possible links. At each cost 
level the average density is calculated as the sum of densities of PS networks divided by the 
number of PS networks. Note that a complete network has a density of 1 and an empty network 










Figure 4: Efficiency of PS networks. 
 
 
19 globally efficient 
(11: 7 empty, 4 M) 
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3, 5, and 7 cycles 
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range  ≥ 4 (3) 
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